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STUDENT ARTICLES
UNAUTHORIZED WORK STOPPAGES-
"STRANGER PICKETS" IN THE
COALFIELDS
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the bituminous coal industry has been beset
by labor unrest manifested in the form of unauthorized "wildcat"
strikes. There has been an apparent increase in the tendency of
many coal miners to resort to spontaneous, unauthorized work
stoppages over various types of disputes with their employers.
Many of these work stoppages are the result of disputes that are
subject to resolution through the mandatory grievance and arbitra-
tion mechanism incorporated in the series of collective bargaining
agreements entered into between the Bituminous Coal Operator's
Association and the United Mine Workers of America (hereinafter
BCOA and UMWA).1 There has also been frequent use of "roving,"
or "stranger," pickets, where miners involved in a dispute at a
particular mine unilaterally establish picket lines at other mines
of the same employer or other employers, regardless of the desire
of those other employees to cease work or become involved in a
dispute not their own. The tradition among UMWA members,
born of years of severe hardship and concerted-struggle, and passed
to the current generation of miners, dictates that no miner cross
the picket line of a brother miner. The result is that a purely local
dispute may grow into an industry-wide work stoppage. The con-
comitant losses of coal production, wages, profits, contributions to
the health and retirement funds, and tax revenues are well docu-
mented.
Many coal operators have responded to these problems by
resorting to the Federal courts to control the strikes and strikers.
The resulting cases represent the most significant coal-related
labor law developments of 1977, and are the subject of this note.
In order to understand these cases, however, one must first look at
the background upon which they rest.
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements of 1968, 1971 and 1974.
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BACKGROUND
The general federal labor policy pertaining to the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements in the federal courts was expli-
cated in the landmark case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills. 2 In Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court determined that the
policy of the Labor Management Relations Act of 19473 was to
foster peaceful industrial relations by making voluntary collective
bargaining agreements enforceable by either party, that Congress
favored no-strike agreements, and that an agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes was the quid pro quo for a promise not to
strike.' The Court held that labor contract grievance-arbitration
provisions were specifically enforceable in federal courts under sec-
tion 301(a) of the LMRA.5 Because of the policy favoring peaceful
resolution of labor disputes through arbitration6 the Supreme
Court subsequently held, in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co.,7 that when parties to a collective bargaining agreement have
agreed to final and binding arbitration, there arises an implied
duty not to strike over those matters subject to arbitration. The
effect of these cases was to render a union liable for breach of
contract in a section 301(a) proceeding when a strike occurs over a
dispute that was subject to resolution through mandatory arbitra-
tion provisions. The federal courts, however, were precluded from
enjoining work stoppages in labor disputes by section four of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 This prohibition applied without regard to
2 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970) [also known as the Taft-Hartley Act]
[hereinafter cited as LMRA].
353 U.S. at 453-55.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1970) provides ip part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
I E.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
7 369 U.S. 95, 105-106 (1962).
8 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons partici-
pating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
2
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the presence of an express or implied no-strike promise or
grievance-arbitration provision.'
The Supreme Court altered its position in Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 10 in which it held that section
four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prohibit a federal court
from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment where the agreement contained provisions for binding arbi-
tration of the dispute over which the strike resulted. This holding
was premised upon the national labor policy favoring peaceful,
voluntary resolution of industrial disputes." Arbitration was
deemed central to this national policy. The Court reasoned that
since a denial of injunctive relief would often deprive an employer
of the only effective means of enforcing a no-strike clause, employ-
ers might be discouraged from entering into collective bargaining
agreements with arbitration provisions that could be enforced
against them.2 The Court stated that the core purposes of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 would not be vitiated by the limited use
of injunctive relief when necessary to promote the policy favoring
arbitration. Boys Markets thus provided a judicial remedy that
management could invoke whenever employees chose to strike in
disregard of mandatory contractual grievance-arbitration proce-
dures. It should be emphasized that the Court characterized its
holding as "narrow,"" and to be applied only in limited circum-
stances. 5
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;....
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by
any other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion
of their interests in a labor dispute;....
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
2D 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S.
195 (1962).
" Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. at 252.
'z Id. at 248, 252.
t Id. at 253.
14 Id.
" The oft-cited formula as to when Boys Markets injunctive relief is proper is:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunc-
tive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the
case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it
is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbi-
[Vol. 80
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The presence of mandatory grievance and arbitration provi-
sions in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements" has
therefore provided a basis for the judicial imposition of an implied
no-strike clause coterminous with the scope of the grievance-
arbitration mechanism upon those collective bargaining agree-
ments.'" This implied no-strike clause is enforceable by injunction
where the strike is over an arbitrable grievance. The employer also
has the right to recover damages for breach of contract in a section
301(a) proceeding.
A conflict of authority developed among the circuit courts of
appeals over the applicability of Boys Markets injunctive relief to
work stoppages resulting from a refusal of employees to cross
picket lines established by other workers.' 8 This conflict was re-
solved by the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel-
workers of America.' The majority framed the issue in Buffalo
Forge as "whether a federal court may enjoin a sympathy strike
pending the arbitrator's decision as to whether the strike is forbid-
den by the express no-strike clause contained in the collective
bargaining contract to which the striking union is a party."" The
five judge majority distinguished Boys Markets and held that sec-
tion four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited injunctive relief
in this situation.' The essential factor in Buffalo Forge was that
trate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds
that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be
ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against
the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider
whether the issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary
principles of equity ... and whether the employer will suffer more from
the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance.
398 U.S. at 254, quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 at 228
(Brennan, J., dissenting opinion).
11 Article XXIII, National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974; Article
XVII, National. Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971; Article -, National
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968.
11 See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382
(1974).
"8 Compare NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502
F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); and Monongahela Power
Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973) (both upholding the granting
of injunctive relief); with Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d
1372 (5th Cir. 1972); and Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical
Union # 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975) (both denying injunctive relief).
19 428 U.S. 397 (1976); noted in 79 W. VA. L. Rav. 610 (1977).
21 428 U.S. at 399.
11 The Court recognized that if an arbitrator had ruled that the sympathy
4
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the strike, while perhaps constituting an arbitrable issue itself, was
not the result of any dispute that would have been subject to
resolution by arbitration between the employer and the sympathy
strikers. Therefore "[tihe strike had neither the purpose nor the
effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriv-
ing the employer of its bargain." Moreover, while such a strike
might have been a breach of a private contract, it did no injury to
the national policy favoring arbitration, and therefore the Norris-
LaGuardia anti-injunction prohibition was deemed paramount."
Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge provide the judicial setting
in which the recurring problems of industrial strife in the bitumi-
nous coal industry have recently been litigated. A reading of the
cases in this area reveals two related, but analytically distinct,
problematic situations: (1) the propensity of some miners and local
unions of the UMWA to engage in frequent work stoppages over
arbitrable disputes; and (2) the spread of work stoppages (whether
or not they arise over arbitrable grievances) from the mine of origin
to other mines via "roving" or "stranger" pickets. In section 301
actions in federal courts, coal operators have sought to halt alleged
"patterns and practices" of repeated work stoppages over arbitra-
ble grievances through the use of prospective Boys Markets injunc-
tions,2' and by attempts to require the International Union to
adopt specific policies and practices designed to end recurring
work stoppages by independent-minded locals.'
The most significant developments have occurred in those
cases in which attempts have been made to curtail the spread of
wildcat strikes. Buffalo Forge has provided a shield for the miners
when they have refused to cross picket lines established by
stranger pickets. However, theories have been advanced to circum-
vent the effect of Buffalo Forge by distinguishing that case on the
following grounds: (1) that Buffalo Forge is not applicable where
the relief sought is damages;" (2) that Buffalo Forge controls only
when a picket line is established by workers engaged in a lawful
strike; therefore, when stranger pickets are engaged in a strike over
an arbitrable grievance, Buffalo Forge does not provide a defense
strike was in breach of a no-strike clause, the strike would have been enjoinable in
federal court. Id. at 405.
2 Id. at 408.
2 Id. at 409-13.
2 See text accompanying notes 69-78, 128-140 infra.
See text accompanying notes 64-81, infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 31-41, 127 infra.
[Vol. 80
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to those employees who refuse to cross that picket line; and, (3)
that a union's refusal to arbitrate over the legality of the refusal
of its members to cross a stranger picket line constitutes an enjoin-
able breach of contract in and of itself. Yet another approach is
illustrated in cases where damages have been sought against the
International and various district levels of the UMWA for failure
to halt the spread of wildcat strikes." One case also demonstrates
an attempt by coal operator attorneys to invoke the Declaratory
Judgement Act as a vehicle for constraining work stoppages."
Although there is a great deal of apparent overlap among the
issues dealt with in the cases discussed, each case will be treated
separately so that the impact of subtle factual distinctions may be
fully understood, and over-generalization avoided.
THIRD CIRCUIT
The paradigmatic factual situation recurrent in these cases is
present in United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers.' In
August, 1969, employees of the Christopher Coal Company in West
Virginia, members of UMWA Local 1058, engaged in a work stop-
page to protest the discharge of five local union officers and com-
mitteemen following a job bidding dispute. Roving pickets from
Local 1058 established a picket line at U. S. Steel's Robena Mine
Complex in Pennsylvania. Employees at the Robena Complex,
members of UMWA Local 6321, refused to cross the picket line. U.
S. Steel subsequently brought an action against the International
UMWA, District 4 and Local Union 6321 to recover monetary dam-
ages resulting from the week long work stoppage.2 A jury returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the case was brought before
the Third Circuit on appeal." Judge Rosenn, writing for the court,
stated the central issue as:
" See text accompanying notes 44-47, 93-110, 122-126 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 42-43 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 48-63, 115-121 infra.
See text accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
2 548 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1976).
22 Plaintiff also originally had sought a preliminary injunction but did not
proceed with this because the Robena employees had returned to work. Id. at n.7.
" At trial in November, 1973, plaintiff had alleged that the Robena employees
were engaged in a sympathy strike in support of the West Virginia miners, and that
the failure to invoke the contractual grievance-arbitration mechanism constituted
a breach of the contract. The defendants denied this allegation and asserted that
the work-stoppage resulted from the Robena miners' concern for their safety, as the
West Virginia miners had allegedly threatened violence. Such a claim would not
6
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whether a union can be held liable to an employer in money
damages for the refusal of union members to cross a stranger
picket line when the collective bargaining agreement between
the union and the employer provides a detailed grievance-
arbitration procedure but contains no express no-strike clause.3
Because of its interpretation of Buffalo Forge, which had been
decided while the appeal was pending, the court reversed the
award of damages.
The court recognized that the denial of injunctive relief in
Buffalo Forge was founded upon the prohibitions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act," and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply
to damage actions. It nevertheless considered Buffalo Forge to be
dispositive of the claims at issue because, as the court noted, the
propriety of an award of monetary damages following a work stop-
page is dependent upon whether the work stoppage constituted a
breach of a contractual duty not to strike." Since the collective
bargaining agreement at issue did not contain an express no-strike
promise, the determination as to whether the work stoppage was
a breach of contract was dependent upon whether the dispute un-
derlying the work stoppage was subject to the mandatory
grievance-arbitration provisions of the contract.37 Because of the
implicit finding by the jury that the strike was a sympathy strike,
and in the absence of an express no-strike clause, the court deemed
Buffalo Forge directly controlling of the issue:
Had the contract in the instant case contained a no-strike
clause, the issue whether the sympathy strike violated the
union's no-strike undertaking might have been arbitrable. In
the absence of a no-strike clause however, Buffalo Forge estab-
lishes that there is "no possible basis for implying from the
existence of an arbitration clause a promise not to strike that
have constituted a breach of the duty to arbitrate under the circuit law at that time.
See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973). Because of the
subsequent reversal of Gateway, Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974),
and the intervening ruling in Buffalo Forge, the parties switched positions in their
arguments before the Third Circuit. For purposes of deciding the appeal, and in
light of the trial court's jury instructions, the court treated the verdict in favor of
plaintiff as an implied finding that the Robena workers were engaged in a sympathy
strike. Id. at 70, 72-73.
" Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
" 548 F.2d at 72.
37 Id.
[Vol. 80
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could have been violated by the sympathy strike" in this case.
428 U.S. at 408.3
This was true because the underlying dispute in the sympathy
strike, the dispute between Christopher Coal and Local 1058, was
not subject to, nor could it have been resolved by, arbitration
between U. S. Steel and Local 6321.11
The holding in U. S. Steel is a correct application of Buffalo
Forge. In a true sympathy strike situation the underlying dispute
cannot be resolved by arbitration between the sympathy strikers
and their employer. In the absence of an express no-strike promise
a court cannot imply a promise not to strike over non-arbitrable
matters. Subversion of the arbitration process is the only justifica-
tion for the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia pro-
hibition." Therefore, in the situation present in U. S. Steel there
was no basis for implying a promise not to engage in a sympathy
strike. Such a work stoppage could not have been a breach of
contract, and the Third Circuit so held as a matter of law.4'
The plaintiff, U. S. Steel Corporation, attempted to avoid the
effect of Buffalo Forge by raising what might appropriately be
termed the "bootstrap argument": that the union was liable for
breach of contract for its failure to arbitrate the issue as to whether
union members had the right to honor a stranger picket line. The
court disposed of this contention by noting that Buffalo Forge had
flatly held that a promise not to engage in sympathy strikes cannot
be implied solely from the presence of arbitration provisions, and
the union therefore had no contractual duty to arbitrate the issue
already settled in Buffalo Forge.4" The court did indicate that the
result might have been different had the contract contained a gen-
eral no-strike promise.43
In U. S. Steel, the underlying dispute, or "primary dispute,"4 4
was the job bidding/discharge controversy between Christopher
Coal and Local 1058. That dispute was apparently subject to the
mandatory grievance-arbitration provisions of the national coal
"Id. at 73.
" Id.
398 U.S. at 249-53.
" 548 F.2d at 73.
2 Id. at n.13.
11 Id. This dictum, however, is questionable, as the collective bargaining agree-
ment in Buffalo Forge contained an express, general no-strike promise.
" Id. at 74. See note 52 infra.
8
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contract, thus the Local 1058 work stoppage was illegal5 Plaintiff
argued that Buffalo Forge was distinguishable on this basis." The
court, relying on the key of arbitrability, refuted this attempt to
impute the illegality of the stranger pickets', or "primary" strike,
to those who refused to cross the stranger picketline; "The Robena
strike was not over any dispute 'between the Union and the em-
ployer' - between UMW and U. S. Steel - that was subject to
arbitration." 7 While the discussion of this issue was scant, it ap-
pears that the result and rationale of U. S. Steel are consistent
with Buffalo Forge.
The final argument raised by U. S. Steel was that the Interna-
tional and district unions were liable in damages for failure to take
"all reasonable steps" to terminate the strike by Local 1058 and
to prevent its spread."' This approach would have placed liability
only upon the International and the district unions. The court
summarily disposed of this argument by noting that the issue of
union liability for the spread of the strike had not been tried in the
court below.
The question left open in U. S. Steel was squarely faced and
resolved in Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
America,49 in which the court considered the certified question:
Whether the International Union, UMWA, [can be] liable in
damages for failing to use every reasonable effort to stop the
spread of illegal wildcat strikes waged by UMWA members
against other employers, thereby inducing plaintiff's employees
to engage in sympathy strikes.0
Republic Steel had brought actions for injunctive relief and
damages as a result of work stoppages occurring when employees
at two of Republic's mines refused to cross picket lines established
by pickets who were subsequently determined to be employees of
Buckeye Coal Company. The Republic and Buckeye employees
were members of the UMWA. The record on appeal did not dis-
close the nature of the dispute between Buckeye and its employees.
13 The court, however, on the basis of the record before it, refused to assume
this to be true. Id.
11 The underlying, or primary strike, in Buffalo Forge was a lawful economic
strike. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. at 400 (1976).
" 548 F.2d at 74, citing Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,
428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976).
0 548 F.2d at 74.
" 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 469.
[Vol. 80
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Republic sought damages against the International UMWA,
the district, subdistrict and local unions, as well as the individual
union officers who represented its employees. Republic argued that
the rationale of Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters5 provided a basis for liability for the failure of a
union to use all reasonable efforts to prevent the spread of an
unauthorized and allegedly illegal work stoppage to another em-
ployer. The union argued that the rule of Buffalo Forge, as well as
the holding in U. S. Steel, precluded liability for damages in a
sympathy strike context.
Judge Aldisert, writing for the court, noted that neither
Buffalo Forge nor U. S. Steel barred the relief sought by plaintiff.
The theory advanced by plaintiff was that the sympathy strike
"resulted from an illegal underlying strike whose issues were sub-
ject to the compulsory settlement procedures of a collective bar-
gaining agreement."5 It was noted that U. S. Steel was not tried
on the theory advanced by plaintiff in Republic. 3 Moreover, both
U. S. Steel and Buffalo Forge shared "the crucial factor of the non-
arbitrability of issues which had precipitated the underlying
strike."5 That is, Buffalo Forge "did not decide what remedies are
available to an employer when the issues precipitating the under-
lying strike are subject to settlement procedures." 55
51 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976).
12 570 F.2d at 477. Judge Aldisert has made a significant contribution to the
judicial approach to the problems in these cases by application of the phrase
"underlying strike."
The strike which precipitates the sympathy action is properly referred to
as the "underlying strike." Although the terms "primary" and
"secondary" strike have sometimes appeared in reference to the underly-
ing and sympathy strikes, respectively, it is thought that the former
terms are more properly used as terms of art in labor boycott situations.
V. at n.7.
13 Id. at 477.
54 Id. This statement is factually correct as to Buffalo Forge, wherein it had
been stipulated that the underlying strike was "bona fide, primary and legal" as it
was an economic strike. 428 U.S. at 403. The reference to the non-arbitrability of
the underlying strike in U.S. Steel is incorrect. There the underlying strike was over
a job-bidding dispute. 548 F.2d at 73 and n.12. The Republic court's quotation of
the language in U.S. Steel concerning non-arbitrability clearly suggests that the
underlying dispute in U.S. Steel was not arbitrable because it was not subject to
resolution by arbitration between the sympathy strikers and their employer. As the
Republic court noted, however, U.S. Steel was "not tried on that theory." Compare
text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
11 570 F.2d at 477.
10
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Having determined that neither Buffalo Forge nor U. S. Steel
controlled, the court held that "in a sympathy strike context, an
International union may be liable for damages if it did not exercise
all reasonable efforts to halt conduct of its members which is
proven to be unlawful."56 Because of the lack of proof in the record
as to the nature of the underlying strikes, however, the cases were
remanded. The court noted that plaintiff's ability to recover was
dependent upon proof that "[1] the dispute stranger UMWA
pickets had with their employer or employers was one that was
subject to the grievance and arbitration clause contained in the
Agreement. . . . [2] [T~he UMWA knew or should have known
of the action of the stranger pickets, and [3] nevertheless failed
to exhaust all reasonable means to bring that unlawful action to
an end.""
The duty imposed upon the International UMWA by the court
in Republic Steel and liability for breach thereof, was premised
upon the International's control over both the stranger pickets and
the sympathy strikers," and the responsibility of the International
as a signatory to an industry-wide agreement and the concomitant
industry-wide commitment to peaceful contractual dispute resolu-
tion.5 9
Although the court held that the International Union may be
liable for failure to halt the spread of illegal wildcat strikes, it
rejected liability as to the other defendants. Applying the rule of
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,'5 the court held that individual
union officers were not liable for alleged unlawful concerted activ-
ity. The district, sub-district and local unions were held not liable
because
[ain implied obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent the
spread of unlawful strikes can be imposed only to the extent
that it can be exercised, and in the sympathy strike context, the
Id. at 470.
7 Id. at 478.
'Id.
Id. at 479. The holding and reasoning in Republic Steel were presaged by a
sensitive and well-stated expression of concern over the increased economic and
social turbulence manifested in relations between miners and coal operators. The
recent incidence of wildcat strikes and violence was perceived by Judge Aldisert as
a disastrous straying from the basic tenets of our national labor policy. The opinion
stated that the holding was "mandated by the public interest. The International
union simply must bear certain obligations if it is to continue to be entitled to the
rights and benefits accorded by our national labor policy." Id., Cf., United States
v. International Union, UMWA, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (D.D.C. 1948).
" Id. at 478. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
[Vol. 80
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crucial communication link which exists between the interna-
tional union and both sets of strikers may well be nonexistent
between the geographically limited branches of that union and
the roving pickets.61
The result in Republic Steel is not inconsistent with our na-
tional labor policy and the rights and obligations of parties to a
national collective bargaining agreement. However, the holding in
that case should not be read as allowing, nor should it be extended
to allow, the imputation of the illegality of the underlying strike
to the sympathy strike. It would appear that Buffalo Forge and
U. S. Steel 2 preclude an award of damages against employees
who engage in a sympathy strike, regardless of the illegality of the
underlying strike. It would also be a misapplication of the rationale
underlying Republic and Eazor Express63 to attempt to use those
cases as support for the imputation of the illegality of the underly-
ing strike to the sympathy strikers for purposes of enjoining the
sympathy strike. The holding and rationale of Republic are clearly
applicable only to a level of union organization which has control
over both wildcat (underlying) strikers and the sympathy strikers.
The duty delineated in Republic is one which arises from the tri-
partite relationship between two locals and their common superior,
the International Union, and possibly a shared district union.
There is no comparable relationship between two local unions;
therefore there is no comparable duty nor basis for liability.
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association Inc. v. International
Union, United Mine Workers of America 4 (hereinafter BCOA) rep-
resents an attempt by the bargaining agent of the bituminous coal
industry to halt a "national pattern and practice" of illegal work
stoppages by imposing specific duties upon the International
Union, UMWA by means of a nationwide injunction and declara-
tion of obligations. The complaint alleged a national pattern and
practice of picketing and work stoppages over disputes that were
subject to resolution through the grievance and arbitration provi-
sions of the 1974 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, and
that the International Union, UMWA, had breached its obligation
to maintain the integrity of the contract by failing to use reasona-
at 570 F.2d 467, 478. The court noted that in a case wherein sufficient allega-
tions and proof are present that various sub-levels of a union have control over both
sets of strikers, a different result might obtain.
" 548 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1976).
' 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976).
64 431 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
12
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ble efforts to insure compliance with that agreement." The case
was decided on a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, and therefore
the allegations of the complaint were taken as true." Plaintiff
sought the imposition of an order upon the International which
would contain very extensive and specific provisions for halting
future contract violations and for disciplining non-complying lo-
cals7
The court held that the complaint did allege a breach of the
1974 contract." It next considered the availability of injunctive
relief which the court described as "prospective in the sense that
future action is proscribed in situations not yet existing and re-
moved from the present facts."" After recognizing that a prospec-
tive Boys Markets injunction would be allowed in some circum-
stances in the Third Circuit pursuant to United States Steel Corp.
v. U.M. W.A.," and in other circuits 7 1 the court held that the in-
junctive relief requested was not permissible. 72 U. S. Steel was
distinguished because the relief granted therein applied to employ-
ees of a single employer at a single work complex.7 Moreover, the
court noted that the broad relief requested would violate the
Norris-LaGuardia Act as interpreted in Boys Markets and Buffalo
Forge.7' Specifically, it was indicated that the requested relief
would constitute
[a]n advance determination by the Court as to the specific
duties of the International Union, without regard to the many
and varied factual circumstances in which a dispute might
arise, [and which] would expose the International to the sanc-
tions of contempt despite what might be a good faith belief in
See Article XXVII, National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974.
431 F. Supp. 774, 778. See also Consolidation Coal Co. v. International
Union, UMWA, 431 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Pa. 1977), a companion case having essen-
tially the same claims at issue, wherein the allegations of a "national pattern and
practice" of breach of contract, as alleged in BCOA, were supported by evidence
of record.
07 431 F. Supp. at 777-78; see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. International
Union, UMWA, 431 F. Supp. at 789-92.
0 431 F. Supp. at 778.
d' Id. at 780.
70 534 F.2d 1063, rehearing denied, 534 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1976).
" Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974); CF&I
Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974);
contra, United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 519 F.2d
1263 (5th Cir. 1975).
12 431 F. Supp. at 782.
73 Id.
1, Id. at 783.
[Vol. 80
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the legality of a particular strike or walk-out. Lawful union
activity would thus be "chilled." 7
Another reason for the denial of requested injunctive relief was
the fact that some of the members of the BCOA had no facilities
whatsoever within the Western District of Pennsylvania nor within
the Third Circuit.7 Further, the court noted that such an injunc-
tion would be improper because the legal obligations of the defen-
dant and other branches of the union varied among the judicial
circuits.77 Finally, and perhaps of greatest significance, the court
reasoned that the extensive injunctive "relief requested would nec-
essarily be a substantial interference with the internal administra-
tion of the union" which would violate the public policy embodied
in Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act.7 8
The court also declined to exercise its discretion to issue a
ruling pursuant to the Declaratory Judgement Act79 to determine
whether the defendant had breached the 1974 contract by failing
to use all reasonable means at its command to end the national
pattern and practice of illegal work stoppages and picketing. The
refusal to issue a declaratory judgement was based on essentially
the same reasons as the denial of injunctive relief: i.e., that the
judgment would apply to generalized allegations which did not
actually constitute a concrete caseY° Such a judgment would be
contrary to "a federal labor policy that encourages the private
resolution of disputes in the manner agreed to by the parties.""'
The court felt that the determination sought by plaintiff's request
for declaratory judgment was more suitably made on an ad hoc
basis.
It appears that Judge Weber in BCOA wisely determined that
the relief sought was improper. An analysis of the requested order
makes obvious the extensive and detailed intervention into inter-
nal union affairs that would have resulted, and which certainly
would be inconsistent with established labor policy. Moreover, the
extraterritorial effect of such an order by a U.S. district court
raises the spectre of severe problems of judicial administration.
Finally, the court's refusal to issue a declaratory judgment pro-
Id.
Id. at 784.
SId.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
431 F. Supp. 744, 786.
I d.
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perly rebuffed an attempt to achieve indirectly that which plaintiff
could not achieve directly.
FOURTH Cmcurr
A narrow interpretation of Buffalo Forge by the Fourth Circuit
is suggested by Cedar Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America,82 which involved a wildcat strike that began in southern
West Virginia and led to an industry-wide work stoppage during
the summer of 1976. The appeal was a consolidation of three re-
lated cases in which plaintiff coal companies sought injunctive
relief and damages against striking miners. The facts of each case
vary, and the holdings of the court indicate the parameters of Boys
Markets injunctive relief in the Fourth Circuit.
Case No. 76-1793 began when employees of Cedar Coal Com-
pany, represented by Local Union 1759, UMWA, engaged in a work
stoppage over a job bidding dispute that had been in arbitration,
but which the arbitrator had not, at that time, totally decided.
Subsequently, Cedar suspended two employees; this suspension
was upheld by an arbitrator, but became an additional reason for
the strike.' Cedar then brought suit in the U. S. district court
under section 301(a) of the LMRA seeking injunctive relief and
damages. The company alleged that the defendants had engaged
in a" 'pattern and practice of refusing to submit. . . disputes...
to peaceful settlement through grievance and arbitration proce-
dures,' that this pattern would continue, and that the present
strike was over the arbitrator's rulings both as to the discharged
employees and as to the job posting of the communication job.""
The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later
imposed coercive civil contempt fines upon the union, and con-
tempt fines against two employees. These actions became an addi-
tional basis for the work stoppage. Local 1759 moved to vacate the
restraining order on the following grounds: (1) that the strike was
not enjoinable under the rule of Buffalo Forge and section four of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act because, regardless of the original mo-
tives, the strike had developed into a protest against the use of
federal labor injunctions in the coal fields and therefore was not
over a dispute subject to arbitration;" (2) that because of the vio-
92 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1978).
560 F.2d at 1156-57.
" Id. at 1157.
83 Id.
11 Id. at 1158. As a prerequisite to ending the strike Local 1759 demanded: (1)
[Vol. 80
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lent context of the work stoppage it was not a strike according to
section 502 of the LMRA; 7 and (3) that the union was not liable
because the strike was not authorized, but rather was a wildcat
strike. Without stating any reason for so doing, the district court
continued indefimitely the hearing on Cedar's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction. The temporary restraining order expired, the
strike continued to spread, and Cedar appealed the case."
Addressing the substantive merits of the injunction issues, the
court noted that in all three cases the necessary prerequisites for
the issuance of Boys Markets injunctive relief had been satisfied,
and the only question remaining was the application of the Buffalo
Forge rule to the facts of each case." The original wildcat strike in
Case No. 76-1793 was "squarely" within the scope of Boys
Markets, as the strike began over the job bidding and suspension
disputes, both of which were subject to arbitration, and which had
in fact been arbitrated."0 The most novel and instructive aspect of
Case No. 76-1793 was the rejection of the union's defense that the
strike was not enjoinable because it was ultimately a protest
against federal labor injunctions and thus was not over an arbitra-
ble dispute. The court noted that to allow a union to assert a
defense that the strike was over the actions taken by a court in
such a case "would amount to nothing more nor less than an over-
ruling of Boys Markets by the unilateral act of one of the parties
and would abandon completely the function of the courts in these
cases as set forth in Boys Markets.""1 Since the strike was clearly
that the UMWA "receive justice equal with that given coal companies in the federal
courts;" (2) an investigation to determine whether the judges of U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia had been improperly influenced; (3) that
Cedar Coal dismiss all of its actions in the federal courts; and (4) that all coal
operators refrain from taking any legal or contractual actions against UMWA mem-
bers for actions related to the strike. Id.
" Id. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
u Before dealing with the merits of the substantive issues related to injunctive
relief in the cases, the court held that the cases were not moot merely because the
strikes had ended previous to the decisions on appeal. 560 F.2d 1162-68. Further,
the court held that the indefinite continuance of the hearing on the motion for a
preliminary injunction in Case No. 76-1793 was effectively a denial of the relief
requested and therefor was appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970). 560
F.2d at 1161.
11 560 F.2d at 1168.
0 Id. at 1171.
," Id. This is not to say that the court will not recognize the non-enjoinability
of strikes as a form of social or political protest in a different context. Id. at 1169,
and text accompanying note 4. See Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505
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enjoinable under Boys Markets, it followed that the district court's
action of indefinitely continuing the hearing on the motion for
preliminary injunction was error. 2
Pursuant to their strike against Cedar Coal Company, mem-
bers of Local 1759 picketed mines other than the ones at which
they were employed. On June 24 and 25, 1976, Cedar Coal employ-
ees, members of Local Union 1766, encountered these pickets at
mines within the jurisdiction of Local 1766. The Local 1759 pickets
were purportedly protesting federal labor injunctions. Members of
Local 1766 observed the picket lines, and Case No. 76-1785 re-
sulted." Cedar Coal brought suit under section 301(a) of the
LMRA against Local 1766, the district9 and the International,
alleging, as in Case No. 76-1793, a pattern and practice of refusing
to submit arbitrable disputes to the grievance-arbitration process,
and further alleging
a pattern and practice of the defendants to treat arbitrable
disputes arising at any mine of any signatory operator as their
own, as disputes between all employees and all signatory
operators, and as directly involving the terms and conditions of
employment of all employees at all mines. This strike, the com-
plaint alleged, was over the arbitrator's rulings in the disputes
of Local 1759.'-
The district court judge characterized the work stoppage by Local
1766 members as a sympathy strike, and further noted that the
strike was a protest over real or imagined wrongs by the federal
courts. Relying upon Buffalo Forge, he denied the requested in-
junctive relief and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted."
The Fourth Circuit held the dismissal of the complaint to be
error.97 The reasoning given in support of this holding is the most
significant aspect of the Cedar Coal case. Earlier in the opinion,
the court had analyzed Buffalo Forge and determined that the
F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975), overruled by, Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, n.10 (1976).
,2 Id. at 1171.
13 Id. at 1159.
" Both locals, 1759 and 1766, were contained within UMWA District 17.
1 560 F.2d at 1159 (emphasis added).
D6 Id.
u The court first held that the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was
a final, appealable order per 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). Id. at 1161. As to the mootness
issue, see note 88, supra.
[Vol. 80
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Supreme Court in that case
meant to tie together the non-arbitrability of the underlying
cause with the cause of the strike at issue so that, when the
underlying cause is not subject to arbitration, a refusal to cross
a picket line, generated by a strike over the underlying cause,
is not a violation of a no-strike clause which is enforceable by
injunction against the strike although it may be by arbitration
... . Following Buffalo Forge, it seems that where the underly-
ing issue is not arbitrable, then a refusal to cross a picket line
set up on account of that underlying issue, although the refusal
may be arbitrable, may not be prevented by injunction pending
arbitration.'8
After analyzing the cases overruled by Buffalo Forge, and the rela-
tionship between Buffalo Forge and Boys Markets, the court stated
we take it that a correct construction of Buffalo Forge is to limit
the application of Boys Markets so that it does not apply in
cases where the only dispute between the company and the
union is over the meaning or application of the no-strike provi-
sion, express or implied, which dispute has been brought about
by a dispute which is not arbitrable."
The scope of this interpretation of the law is made clear when
applied to the facts of Case No. 76-1785, wherein the court stated
[w]hile the dispute [between Cedar and Local 17661 may not
technically have been 'over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate,' . . . because it is at least
arguable that Cedar could not have conceded the arbitrable
issue to Local 1766, it rather being engaged in arbitration with
Local 1759, we think that construction of Boys Markets is too
narrow here. [1] Here, the employer is the same as to both
Locals; [2] the collective bargaining agreement is the same;
[3] the bargaining unit is the same; [4] the locality of employ-
ment is the same; and [5] most importantly, the purpose of
1766's refusal to cross the 1759 picket lines was not to coerce
Cedar into conceding an issue to Local 1759 which was not
arbitrable; rather, the purpose of the 1766 strike was to coerce
Cedar into conceding an issue to Local 1759 which was admit-
tedly arbitrable.'"
On this basis, the court held that Boys Markets, not Buffalo Forge,
controlled, and therefore the dismissal of the comhplaint was
error."'
Id. at 1169 (citation omitted).
" Id. at 1170.
'® Id. at 1171-72.
"' Id. at 1172.
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It is important to note that the court of appeals treated the
allegations of Cedar's complaint as true, including the allegation
that Local 1766 was striking over the arbitrator's ruling in the
dispute between Local 1759 and Cedar."2 This posture on appeal
is unfortunate as it renders the scope of the holding less than
totally clear. Obviously the Boys Markets exception to section four
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act arises where a strike operates to vi-
tiate a contractually agreed upon grievance-arbitration mecha-
nism. The Supreme Court, however, has never held that the refusal
of members of one union, or local, to cross picket lines established
by members of another union, or local, may be enjoined despite the
prohibitions of section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Where
the underlying strike is over an arbitrable grievance, virtually any
refusal to cross such a picket line can be characterized as an at-
tempt to coerce the illegal strikers' employer to abdicate instead
of arbitrate. The remedy for the illegally struck employer is to
obtain a valid Boys Markets injunction against its own employees.
And while those engaged in a sympathy strike or refusal to cross
picket lines may be indirectly pressuring the other employer, and
harming their own employer as well, there is nevertheless no ar-
bitrable dispute between the sympathy strikers and their own
employer that would fall within the "narrow exception" to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act embodied in Boys Markets. The force of this
argument is more compelling where the no-strike promise that the
sympathy strikers are alleged to have breached is not voluntarily
agreed upon, but is implied from the presence of contractual arbi-
tration provisions. 03
Cedar Coal can be interpreted as holding that the illegality of
a strike over an arbitrable grievance by union A will be imputed
to determine whether a refusal by members of union B to cross
union A's picket line is subject to injunction in a federal court. But
perhaps the holding of Case No, 76-1785 in Cedar Coal is limited
to the situation where sympathy strikers have an identity of inter-
"' Id. at 1171.
' Both the majority and dissent in Buffalo Forge stated that a no-strike prom-
ise implied from the presence of contractual grievance and arbitration provisions
does not extend to sympathy strikes. The Court stated: "[tlo the extent that ...
courts ... have assumed that a mandatory arbitration clause implies a commit-
ment not to engage in sympathy strikes, they are wrong." 428 U.S. at 408; accord,
id. at 425, n.17 (dissenting opinion). A major tenet of federal labor policy is that
workers have the right to strike, and although that right may be waived, NLRB v.
Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953), such waiver should be explicitly
stated. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
[Vol. 80
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ests with the underlying (illegal) strikers, such as where they share
a common employer, collective bargaining agreement, bargaining
unit, locality of employment or certain practical interests. There
is language suggesting such an approach in the case." 4 Alterna-
tively, the court may have accepted the argument that where em-
ployees refuse to cross a picket line established by pickets proven
to be striking illegally, then the sympathy strikers may also be
enjoined. 105 Regardless of whether Case No. 76-1785 of Cedar Coal
is premised upon this basis or upon a showing of identity of inter-
ests between underlying and sympathy strikers, the holding is an
unwarranted extension of the federal injunctive power in labor
disputes, for it contravenes the Congressional prohibition of sec-
tion four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as well as the consistent
themes of federal labor policy. Moreover, imputation of illegality,
as a judicial technique in Boys Markets-Buffalo Forge cases, will
do nothing to mitigate the problems endemic in labor relations in
the eastern bituminous coal fields, but will only exacerbate the
situation. Such a holding demonstrates a refusal to acknowledge
the practical reality of life in the organized coal industry; miners
refuse to cross a picket line for many reasons or for a single reason:
because it is there.
The third action consolidated into Cedar Coal, Case No. 76-
1846, provides some indication that the holding of Case No. 76-
1985 may depend upon the identity-of-interests approach, rather
than an imputation of illegality to sympathy strikers. In Case No.
76-1846, Southern Ohio Coal Company, a signatory to the national
coal contract, brought an action under section 301(a) of the LMRA
against its employees, members of Local Union 1949, UMWA, for
their failure to cross picket lines established by persons allegedly
protesting the federal injunction against Local 1759.111 The district
court found that the pickets were not members of Local 1949, that
1949 members refused to cross the line "perhaps from fear or per-
haps from exercise of a right not to cross picket lines, or perhaps
for other reasons, respectful of the picket line and its meaning to
"' See text accompanying note 100, supra.
'a Regardless of the correctness of such a rule, it would result in other prob-
lems: Is it relevant in an action for damages whether the sympathy strikers had
actual knowledge that stranger pickets were engaged in an unlawful strike? What
happens if stranger pickets are from different employers and some are engaged in
a lawful strike while the others are engaged in an unlawful strike? What happens
when mixed motives, such as fear and sympathy, compel a refusal to cross?
WI' 560 F.2d at 1160.
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them."' 7 Relying upon Buffalo Forge, the district court denied
Southern's motion for injunctive relief.18 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed.
In upholding the district court's decision the Fourth Circuit
noted that
there was no dispute between Southern and Local 1949 which
had anything to do with the picket line, or not crossing it, until
after the picket line appeared .... Even considering that the
underlying purpose of 1949's strike may have been to put indi-
rect pressure on Cedar to concede an arbitrable issue to Local
1759, Southern could concede nothing to Local 1759 because it
was not bound to it by a collective bargaining agreement, and
there was no dispute between Southern and Local 1759.10
This language seems to rebut the implication in Case No. 76-1785
of an imputation of the illegality of the underlying strike to sympa-
thy strikers. Unlike the sister locals in Cases 76-1793 and 76-1785
(Locals 1759 and 1766 respectively) there was no basis for recogniz-
ing an identity of interests between Locals 1949 and 1759 other
than the common bond between any two local unions of the
UMWA.
In summary, it appears that a Boys Markets injunction will
issue in the Fourth Circuit when the object of the sympathy strike
is "to compel the company to concede an arbitrable issue"'1 and
there is some linkage, or common interests, or common goal be-
tween the illegal, underlying strikers and those who refuse to cross
the illegal strikers' picket line. On the other hand, an injunction
will be barred by the rule of Buffalo Forge where the sympathy
strikers have no such common bond with the illegal strikers.
SIXTH CIRCUIT
In Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America,' the Sixth Circuit adopted a significantly different in-
terpretation and application of Buffalo Forge from that of the
Fourth Circuit. The case began with a series of work stoppages in
1975 over arbitrable grievances at three mines owned by Southern,
the employees of which were represented by Local Unions 1886,
107 Id.
its Id.
'9 Id. at 1172.
"l Id. at 1170.
" 551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 80
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1890, and 1957 of the UMWA. Southern sought injunctive relief
against the three local unions, District 6, and the International
Union, UMWA. Having found a pattern of disregard for the con-
tractual dispute settlement procedures, the district court granted
injunctions against the three locals but refused to extend the or-
ders to the district or International defendants. 1 2 The district
court's orders required the locals to refrain from engaging in any
work stoppage, and from encouraging others to cease work. The
orders further required them to "utilize the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of 1974, with respect to arbitrable grievances; and [t]o take all
action which may be necessary to assure compliance with the
terms of" ' that contract. The order was still in effect in July, 1976,
when Southern employees refused to cross picket lines allegedly
established at Southern's mines by employees of Cedar Coal Com-
pany from West Virginia. Southern brought motions for orders to
show cause why its employees should not be held in contempt. The
district court, relying upon Buffalo Forge, denied Southern's mo-
tions."' Southern appealed that denial, as well as the court's pre-
vious refusal to extend the application of the orders against the
district and International Unions. The local unions appealed the
original injunctions on the grounds that they were, inter alia,
vague and overbroad.
The court of appeals first held that the injunctions issued in
1975 were proper under the rule of Boys Markets because the origi-
nal disputes were subject to arbitration. "5 The court next consid-
ered Southern's contention that the district court erred in refusing
to extend the injunctions to the district and International Unions.
The district court had found that the district and International
Unions had notice of the 1975 work stoppages but held that notice
alone was not a sufficient basis for application of the injunctions
to those defendants. The district court had also found that neither
the district nor the International had provoked or instigated the
1976 work stoppages."' Southern contended that the district and
International Unions had a duty to use "all 'reasonable means' at
their disposal to end the unauthorized strikes" and should be liable
for failure to do so."' The court rejected this "agency theory" of
2 Id. at 699-700.
13 Id. at 699.
" Id. at 700.
"' Id. at 701.
Il d.
117 Id.
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liability and reiterated the established law of the circuit"' "that a
union may [not] be held responsible for the 'mass action' of its
members in staging an unauthorized strike or for failure to use its
'best efforts' in curtailing one. . . . [A] union may only be held
responsible for the authorized or ratified actions of its officers and
agents.""' The court stated that a contrary result might obtain in
a case in which the record indicated that the district or Interna-
tional Union "encouraged, condoned or induced the
[unauthorized] strikes, either through action or inaction.' ' 0
Moreover, a union's "studied ambivalence toward an unauthorized
strike may constitute sufficient inducement, encouragement and
condonation" of that strike so as to render the union subject to
injunctive relief and damages.'2 ' However, the record in Southern
Ohio contained no evidence of such inducement or condonation.
The court next considered the district court's refusal to issue
show cause orders against the defendant local unions for refusing
to cross the stranger picket lines. The court, relying on Buffalo
Forge, affirmed. Southern had argued that Buffalo Forge was not
controlling on this issue because the stranger pickets were engaged
in an illegal work stoppage and that the Southern employees had
ratified the illegal strike and adopted its goals by refusing to cross
the picket lines. Southern sought to buttress this argument, and
further distinguish Buffalo Forge, by virtue of the fact that the
stranger (underlying) pickets and sympathy strikers were members
of the same bargaining unit and were under the same contract. The
court wisely rejected this argument, stating that the "bare asser-
tion" that both sets of strikers are members of the same bargaining
unit under the same contract did not further the central inquiry
under Buffalo Forge: i.e., "whether the employees sought to be
enjoined are striking over issues which they have agreed to arbi-
trate."'2
", E.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. Local Unions, 543 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1976).
"' 551 F.2d at 701. Accord, United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking
Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955); contra, Republic Steel, supra note 48, and text
accompanying notes 48-60, supra.
"1 551 F.2d at 701.
I2I Id.
" Id. at 703. The court also noted that arbitration under the 1974 coal agree-
ment was on a "mine-by-mine" basis, with only a possibility of central review by
the Arbitration Review Board in certain instances. Therefore, the benefit to be
derived by the sympathy strikers from resolution of the underlying, illegal strike,
in favor of the underlying strikers, is highly tenuous and speculative. Id. at 703 and
n.6. This reference to the arbitration procedure is contrary to the inference drawn
[Vol. 80
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The court also rejected any theory of liability based on the
imputation of the illegality of the underlying strike to the sympa-
thy strikers. Southern argued that it would be anomalous to hold
that, although a strike over an arbitrable grievance is illegal and
therefore enjoinable, a strike in support of that illegal strike is not
enjoinable. This argument was rejected because: (1) it shifted "the
focus of the court's inquiry from the employees against whom the
injunction is sought to the illegal pickets," (2) thereby posing prob-
lems of proof since the illegal pickets usually are not parties to the
action; and (3) such a rule would force employees to determine the
legality or illegality of the stranger pickets' dispute before deciding
whether or not to honor the stranger picketline.'1 The proper focus
of the court in a section 301(a) injunction proceeding is upon the
employees sought to be enjoined. 2' The only basis for a "Boys
Markets injunction is a finding that the issue underlying the work
stoppage is arbitrable." ' Where the employees in question have
refused to cross a stranger picketline, that refusal to cross is the
underlying issue, and "whether motivated by sympathy or fear of
reprisal, the work stoppage is not caused by an arbitrable dispute
between the mine workers and the employer."' 26 In other words, the
lawfulness of the stranger picketline is irrelevant in a section
301(a) proceeding in which the employees sought to be enjoined are
those who refuse to cross a stranger picketline.
Southern also asserted the "bootstrap" argument that the
arbitration clause at issue was broad enough to include the dispute
as to whether the employees had a right to engage in a sympathy
strike, and therefore injunctive relief would be proper pending an
arbitrator's resolution of that issue. This approach was.rejected in
accordance with the principle accepted by both the majority and
dissent in Buffalo Forge: "that an implied no-strike agreement
does not extend to sympathy strikes."'
from that provision by the Fourth Circuit in Cedar Coal, 560 F.2d 1153, 1172. Where
the sympathy and underlying strikers share not only a common collective bargain-
ing unit and agreement, but also a common employer and a common work situs,
the sympathy strikers might well benefit from the employer's concession of an
arbitrable issue to the underlying, illegal strikers. However, it is questionable
whether sympathy strikers in most situations would benefit from such a concession,
even where sympathy and underlying strikers share a common employer.
'1 551 F.2d at 704.
12s Id.
I2 Id.
I" Id. at 705.
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The court correctly rejected Southern's attempts to circum-
vent the rule of Buffalo Forge. The Boys Markets exception to
section four of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is "narrow" and only
applies where the effect of a work stoppage is to subvert the arbi-
tration process. Quite simply, under the national coal contracts,
where the "cause" of a work stoppage is a refusal by employees to
cross a stranger picketline, whether motivated by sympathy or
fear, then those employees do not have a dispute with their em-
ployer which is subject to resolution by arbitration. Miners who
refuse to cross a stranger picketline have no dispute whatsoever
with their own employer except whether they may observe the
stranger picketline. The absence of an express no-strike promise in
the national coal contracts clearly operates to prohibit the implica-
tion of a "no-sympathy strike" clause. Additionally, the attempts
to shift the focus of inquiry in section 301(a) injunction proceed-
ings from the actions of the miners sought to be enjoined to the
stranger (underlying) pickets' dispute with the stranger pickets'
employer was correctly repudiated as an attempt to make injunc-
tive relief dependent upon factors clearly irrelevant under Boys
Markets and Buffalo Forge.
The final issue on appeal was the union's contention that the
injunctions, originally issued in 1975, were invalid because they
were vague and overbroad. The overbreadth argument was based
upon the claim that the injunctions constituted a ban on all work
stoppages while the contract was in effect, regardless of the arbitr-
ability vel non of the underlying dispute, and therefore the injunc-
tions violated section nine of the Norris-LaGuardia Act'1 and ex-
ceeded the Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia. 2 ' The
injunctions were also, in the union's view, impermissibly vague per
Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The court
thus addressed "the fundamental question of whether an injunc-
tion restraining a work stoppage may ever [be] prospective in
effect and, if so, under what circumstances."''
I 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1970) provides:
[Elvery restraining order or injunction granted in a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition of such
specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill of
complaint or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly included
in said findings of fact made and filed by the court as provided in this
chapter.
In 551 F.2d at 705-06.
130 Id.
13, Id.
[Vol. 80
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The court analyzed the position taken on this issue in other
circuits. 32 However, primary support for a prospective injunction
was found in Boys Markets, as the Court therein had recognized
that an express or implied no-strike promise was the quid pro quo
for arbitration provisions, and that widespread disregard of the no-
strike promise would deprive the employer of his bargain and
thereby undermine the national policy favoring arbitration. The
court stated,
An employer faced with the tactic of repeated strikes over ar-
bitrable grievances need not repair to federal court each time
his plant is shut down to relitigate issues decided in previous
litigation. Once a court has found that a union is engaged in a
continuing practice of striking over arbitrable disputes and the
Boys Markets guidelines are satisfied, we believe that the ensu-
ing injunction may be extended to encompass future strikes
over disputes similar to those which caused strikes in the past."=
To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would deprive an employer
of an effective remedy and operate to thwart the national policy
favoring arbitration. 13
The court next delineated the requirements governing such
injunctions. It noted that section nine of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
requires the "narrowest possible injunction necessary to effectively
safeguard the plaintiff's rights."' ' The court warned against the
dangers resulting from prospective injunctions, especially the pos-
sibility that an employer may attempt to specifically enforce a no-
strike promise through the court's contempt power, "a result that
Buffalo Forge may not, countenance."'36 The court gave specific
guidance as to when such relief is proper:
prospective injunctions should only be granted in extreme cases
where absolutely necessary to preserve the arbitration process
. . . .The decree must be narrowly drawn and firmly grounded
on factual support in the record . . . . [Tihe District Court
should expressly find: [1] that the present strike may be en-
I United States Steel v. United Mine Workers of America, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d
Cir. 1976); Donovan Construction Co. v. Construction and Maintenance Laborers
Union, 533 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1976); CF&I Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974); Old Ben Coal Corp., v. Local No. 1487,
UMW, 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974). Contra, United States Steel Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975).
lu 551 F.2d at 709 (citations omitted).
134 Id.
135 Id.
'u Id. at 710.
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joined under Boys Markets; [2] that the union has engaged in
a pattern of strikes over arbitrable grievances; [3] that is likely
to continue; [4] that the strikes constituting the pattern of
violation would warrant relief under the Boys Markets formula;
and, [5] that the decree is limited to specifically identified
areas of dispute which have already been adjudicated and
which satisfy the Boys Markets guidelines.'1
Application of the above criteria demonstrated the invalidity
of the injunctions at issue. The court noted that the injunctions
were overbroad because they restrained virtually all work stop-
pages, and because of a lack of specific findings as to the pattern
of work stoppages.' The vagueness challenge was sustained and
the reference to the contractual arbitration provision in the orders
was held not to cure the vagueness.'39 Finally, the injunctions were
flawed because of the failure to include an order to the employer
to arbitrate disputes, as required by Boys Markets."'
The Sixth Circuit has thus established an intermediate posi-
tion on the availability of prospective Boys Markets relief, one
which demonstrates a keen sensitivity to the realities of industrial
relations in the coal fields, and which may serve as a model of
accommodation of the conflicting interests involved.
CONCLUSION
The recurring problem of unauthorized work stoppages in the
coal industry is not one which is likely to be resolved through
judicial decisions. Courts simply have no control over the economic
and social factors which often give rise to labor unrest in the coal-
fields. In addition, the dictates of federal labor policy require that
courts proceed with caution when asked to intervene in such mat-
ters. Nevertheless, coal companies have done everything within
their power to keep their miners on the job, and resort to the
federal courts has been an important part of these efforts. The
courts have generally responded in a reasonable manner. As the
cases discussed in this note reflect, the courts have shown an un-
derstanding of their limited role and a sensitivity to the basic
principles underlying Federal labor policy.
S. Benjamin Bryant
'37 Id. (citation omitted).
13 Id.
,19 Id. at 710-11.
"' Id. at 711.
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